NOT A CURSE BUT A CHALLENGE

AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY
šFOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SIBERIA

Nikolai S. Rozov

 

Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 49, no. 9, January 2007, pp. 75-82.

English translation by Stephen D. Shenfield from the Russian text, "Ne Prok1iatie, a vyzov: al'temativnaia strategiia razvitiia Sibiri."

 

ôhe book of Fiona îill and Clifford Gaddy The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left Russia Out in the Cold is of interest if only for being a serious study of Siberia, in sharp contrast to the neglect of our region that is typical even of American intel1ectuals. (I have always remembered how one venerable colleague said to me: "Here you are, Nikolai, living in your Novosibirsk - out in the middle of nowhere!"). ôhe authors have devised and applied the clever indicator "temperature per capita" (ôòC). ôhey have viewed the situation regarding the development of Siberia in quite broad historical perspective. And, most important, the general idea of their work stands in sharp contradietion to our established attitudes and convictions justifying almost any effort, expense, and sacrifiee for the sake of the development and settlement of Siberia and the Far East.

First, I shal1 enumerate those propositions and arguments of the authors with which (with insignifieant corrections) it is possible fully to agree. (Their "diagnosis" is on the whole correet.) Then I shal1 try to demonstrate the inadequate nature of the conceptual perspective adopted in the book and the associated dangers of the reeommended "cure," briefly outline other models not considered by the authors, and, finally, propose an alternative strategy for overcoming the "Siberian curse."

 

ôhe partial correctness of the "diagnosis"

During the Soviet period, Siberia was developed in accordance not with a market economy but with a planned economy. It cannot he said that all Soviet plans were useless or harmful. In the development of Siberia, however, a pernicious role was played by certain attitudes of the Soviet leaders and planning agencies: the unconscious (and thus all the stronger) idea that outlays on heating, conveyance of freight, and labor would always be arbitrary, small, and independent of world markets. It is c1ear that without convictions of this kind (and the socioeconomic realities of the Soviet era that supported them) such grandiose and costly projects as Norilsk with its enormous social sphere, swimming pools, winter gardens, and sports halls wou1d not have been carried out.

ôhe authors of the book are also correct to note the pernicious effects of emphasizing the development in Siberia of labor-intensive sectors and technologies-in particular, of machine building. ôhe fact that it costs four times as much to sustain 1ife in Siberia as it does in European Russia is indeed a permanent and depressing macroeconomic factor.

The criticism of the dogmatic principle of the "even economic development of territories" is on the whole correct if only the economic aspect is considered. Canada, Australia, India, China, Brazil, the United States-none of these countries is concerned in the least about such evenness, and this does not impede their dynamic economic development.

ôhe authors are quite right to point to the factor that is second in importance after the notorious cold - the enormous distances and the weak ties oÁ Siberian cities with one another and with world markets. It is just that there are various conclusions that can be drawn from this - for instance, not to abandon vast and isolated territories but, on the contrary, to connect them with one another and with world centers.

îill and Gaddy are also right to note the inevitability and necessity of the integration of Russia, including Siberia, into the world economy. This is obviously more advantageous than the primitive isolationism advocated by Parshev in his book Why Russia Is Not America (òochemu Rossiia ne Amerika]. It is just that there are various ways of entering the world economic system, but this will be discussed later.

I must also agree with one of the authors' recommendations that is based on the analogous and successful experience of Canada. For the extraction and shipping of valuable minerals from territories with severe climates (in Eastern Siberia, besides the winter cold, account must be taken of the difficult mountainous terrain and summertime infestation by mosquitoes, midges, horseflies, and other bloodsucking insects) we should rely on the "tour of duty" system of manning and on seasonal work. We should really build large cities with schools and universities, keep our families, and raise our children in places where conditions are more acceptable.

The authors are quite right to warn against grandiose new state programs for the development and settlement of Siberia, which by force of inertia from Soviet times are still understood in our country in terms of the pumping of funds from the state budget with weak oversight and doubtful returns. However, it is precisely as a result of the "curse of cold and distance" that we cannot entrust the further development of Russia as a whole or Siberia in particular to the notorious "invisible hand of the free market." Here we already pass on to a discussion of the conceptual limitations of the book by îill and Gaddy.

 

When the core is more dangerous than the disease

It cannot he said that Gaddy and îill completely ignore the aspect of geopolitics and national security, but they try their utmost to diminish and smooth over its importance. They form their main conclusions and recommendations solely on the basis of the general economic principles of cost of production and of the reproduction of labor, deploying their index of "temperature per capita" in accordance with the implicit maxim of "settling and developing production where the values of the index are more favorable."

It is possible to agree in part that the rapid economic development and demographic growth of the northern provinces of China are conditioned by interaction with the Russian population of Siberia and the Far East. The authors, however, do not dare think this point through to its logical end. If they did, they would have to assure the reader that the recommended resettlement of a substantial proportion of the Russian population from these regions would be followed immediately by the migration and reduction of the Chinese population of the northern provinces in comparable proportion.

The rapid economic and demographic development of northern China is irreversible for a very simple reason. While the European part of Russia is more densely settled than its Asian part, there is quite enough room there to resettle the Siberians. In China, by contrast, although it too is a vast country, all places that are suitable for settlement are already settled "to the bursting point," so that if Russia's border regions are vacated the Chinese will turn their gaze not to the south but to the north. ôhis is quite irrespective of the intentions of the leadership, friendly relations between the leaders, and similar subjective factors.

Very useful for the theoretical comprehension of the corresponding security issues is the rigorous mathematical model for calculating geopolitical vulnerability that was proposed in the 1960s by Arthur Stinchcombe and successfully applied in 1980 by Randall Collins in his famous prediction of the disintegration of the Soviet Union (see the almanac Vremia mira, no. 1, 2000).

Without delving into mathematical details, the essence of the model is simple. The vulnerability of each point in space (say, Vladivostok, ÷lagoveshchensk, Irkutsk, or Chita) in relation to each state under consideration (say, Russia and China) is inversely proportional to outlays on the creation and deployment to this point of military capacity, while these outlays depend above all on how close to this point population and wealth: the basic sources of the generation of military capacity-are concentrated.

It should be observed that geopolitical vulnerability is a more profound, important, and long-term factor than military vulnerability (correspondingly, the level of protection of a state's territory), which depends on the actual disposition of troops and armaments. Military vulnerability plays the main role in an individual engagement or conflict or in a brief local war. In a longterm perspective, however, the disposition of troops and armaments is itself subordinate to the factor of geopolitical vulnerability, inasmuch as military capacity, as a rule, is created in the vicinity of concentrations of population and wealth and is then redeployed; this always entails outlays. The reader may familiarize himself with the given model in detail by referring to the translation in War and Geopolitics (Voina i geopolitika, Vremia mira, no. 3, 2003). Here I mention only the obvious consequence for the configuration of geopolitical vulnerability that would ensue were we obediently to carry out the well-intentioned recommendations of Gaddy and îill.

The large-scale resettlement of Russians from Siberia and the Far East in European Russia would sharply exacerbate the geopolitical vulnerability (level of protection) of the abandoned regions for Russia, but not change it for China, because, as I have already shown above, the population of China's northern provinces would not migrate to the south.

ôhe compensatory proposals of the book's authors - to create small modern mobile armies in alliance with the United States and Europe - are merely superficial in character, inasmuch as they do not affect the values of the geopolitical vulnerability of Russia's border regions. China too could create such armies, but at lesser expense and to greater effect, using the concentration of population and wealth along its northern borders. For the United States and the European countries the logistical burden (associated with transportation outlays) would be even heavier than for Russia, so we should not place serious hope on an effective military alliance. In addition, it is possible to detect in the proposals of the book' s American authors the artless wish to make Russia more dependent on the NATO countries in the face of the Chinese threat, and, correspondingly, more compliant. Nor should we completely discount the plans of some American "hawks" to carve up Russia (by patronizing "independent" Yakutia and Chukotka) or Japan's ambitions with regard to the Kuriles and Sakhalin. At the moment these ideas seem like delirious raving, but should geopolitical tension and Russia's domestic crisis reach a critical level they will be realized without fail. (In the 1970s and 1980s the separation of the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Belorussia [now Belarus] from Russia likewise seemed like delirious raving, but it was soon accomplished.)

The practical conclusion is obvious: under no conditions should we leave exposed Siberia and the Far East, especially their southern and eastern extremities. Does this mean that, as in the memorable Soviet times, we must again lay the economy and the quality of life of the population on the altar of preservation of military might and security? Does this mean that we must continue to ignore the factor of the "Siberian cold"? Not at all. We .have to find a nontrivial path between Scylla and Charybdis, and for that we shall need geo-economic models.

 

Siberia: A bridge between Europe and East Asia

Despite their theoretical grounding and breadth of vision, Gaddy and îill work within an outdated paradigm of a national economy, applying it to Russia. It is true that with its present-day population Siberia is unable to provide for itself, but this is true even of such great countries as Japan and China. It is only thanks to its active participation in a broad system of international economic interaction that the sharply increased population of these countries is able to avoid hunger and live at its present level of welfare.

Here it is necessary to determine what we can supply to world markets.

ôhe first thing at our disposal is not even our notorious natural resources, but our still unused geographical potential. ôhe theory of central location explains the preferential development of cities and regions in terms of their success in focusing upon themselves the transportation and commercial flows of neighboring and remote economically heterogeneous regions. Russia is situated between two powerful centers-United Europe and East Asia (including China, Japan, and Korea). Commodity exchange between these world regions will grow steadily. Even if various southern projects for a "new silk road" (Beijing-Ankara, bypassing Russia) are realized, demand for a transportation artery through Russia will remain. Academician Moiseyev in his time wrote about this prospect; a detailed elaboration of the idea of a "great cross-country road" can be found in my article in Voprosy filosofii (1997, no. 10).

The relationship between this idea and the proposals of Gaddy and îill is as follows. Resettlement from the most inclement regions of Siberia and the Far East is indeed desirable. However, it should not be to European Russia (where there would be problems with employment), but to the southern parts of those regions - above all, to the line of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Here the state must help create jobs first in building new railroads, modern highways, and housing, and then in providing services for the growing flows of freight between Europe and East Asia.

Special mention must be made of the role of Novosibirsk as the transportation capital of Siberia. Here the main emphasis should be on initiatives to turn the city into a transportation hub, on freight insurance, and on technologies for moving freight. In this case, Novosibirsk will acquire the role of a port (like Amsterdam, London, Hamburg, and New York), and ports have always been places in which financial activity, and, correspondingly, capital are concentrated. There is no need to explain the importance of the concentration of capital for a city's development.

 

A world-systems perspective:
Alliance with Europe in processing Siberian raw material for Asia

In 300 years of Russian settlement, Siberia has never overcome the status of an economic colony. This finds expression, above aî, in the fact that the bulk of local raw material is transported out of Siberia and sold cheaply instead of being processed and sold expensively.

At one time Moscow sold Europe Siberian furs. Here we already have an elementary world-systems model: Europe as the core (center of the world system), Moscow as semiperiphery (an intermediate link in intrasystemic economic exploitation), Siberia as periphery (a backward plundered borderland). In place of furs came hemp, timber, caviar, gold, diamonds, coal, oil, gas, and nonferrous metals, but the schema of interaction remained roughly the same. The proposals of Gaddy and îill are in fact aimed at consolidating the peripheral status of Siberia. Extract raw material, transport it out, and sell it-there is nothing more to be done here.

While agreeing with the authors that it is not rational to locate labor-intensive industry in Siberia, let me observe that the processing of raw material is capital-intensive and science-intensive but not labor-intensive. The consumer is also known - the countries of East Asia (above all, China), the expanding industry of which will require ever increasing amounts of energy and raw material for labor-intensive production units.

A key question is investment in construction. Here we must indeed renounce grandiose programs of "all-union building sites" [a Soviet-era expression- Trans.], but this does not mean that the state has to give up all initiative in relation to the country's strategic development. The same world-systems model comes to our aid: in order to construct processing enterprises as semiperipheral production units, we need to seek interested partners in the core of the world system. The range of choice of investors here is quite wide: The United States, United Europe, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore.

In light of geopolitical and geocultural considerations, it would be most advantageous for Russia to further integrate with Europe and to create spheres of long-term European presence and interest along the Russian-Chinese border.

ôhe concentration of capital, the creation of new jobs, and large-scale housing construction in the southern borderlands of Siberia and the Far East will generate a natural migration trend: it will not be necessary to talk anyone into leaving the cold northern cities. We can manage the extraction and shipping of raw materials quite well by means of the "tour of duty" system of manning. In this context it is well worth discussing the prospect of using the unlimited labor resources of China-with appropriate oversight, of course.

 

ôhe intellectual potential of Siberia and the growing demand for education, science, and technology in Asia

Gaddy and îill almost completely overlook or deliberately ignore one of the biggest achievements of the Soviet era-the creation of a world-level scientific and educational capacity in Siberia and the Far East. Within the bounds of their logic, if the bulk of the population of Siberia must leave the region then there is even less need here for scientific research institutes and universities. As I said above, in the conception of Gaddy and îill, these bounds are set by an oversimplified principle of the economic expediency of material production and by national boundaries. If we take a broader view of the matter, if we take into consideration the markets and demand for education, new technologies, and scientific results, if we take into consideration the rapid growth of Asia, where this demand is already high and will grow steadily, then the accumulated intellectual potential of Siberia will appear in quite a new light.

Where do Chinese, South Korean, and Taiwanese young men and women whose parents are able to pay for their education abroad currently go to study? Above all to the United States, in smaller numbers to Great Britain, a few to Canada, Australia, and the continental countries of Western Europe. Russian higher education, which we so love to caî the best in the world, still occupies a diminutive place on this international market. It is clear that the problem here lies not only and not so much in the quality of education (which in our best universities and technical colleges really is equal to that in comparable institutions in Europe and America) as in management, advertising, students' living conditions, language training, international recognition of diplomas, and other questions that are fully open to resolution. Once again, on our own it is difficult to break into this capricious market.

Here, again, Siberian higher education institutions can and must enter into alliance with European universities that objectively are in competition with American universities, which lay claim to a monopoly of international educational services.

In the same way, a long-term guideline should be the expansion of Siberian science and technology (in alliance with Europe) over the vast expanse of Asia.

* * *

Let us sum up.

I must agree with Gaddy and îill that the construction of enormous cities with labor-intensive production units in the inclement northern areas of Siberia and the Far East was a big mistake and that it is irrational by force of inertia to go further along this road.

At the same time, a massive outflow of population from Siberia and the Far East to European Russia would inevitably give rise to structurally conditioned geopolitical tensions that might be fateful for Russia's territorial integrity.

Correspondingly, it must be a matter of a desired flow of population to the southern areas of Siberia and the Far East, but here too we must find ways to compensate for excessive outlays on sustaining life (above all, on heating and transportation). In addition, it is necessary to find a way to interest people in resettlement, to provide them with jobs and housing, and all without overtaxing the national budget.

ôhe general idea of my approach is to take into account the immediate and long-term interests of the surrounding world economic centers and markets in Siberia and the Far East. Hence, too, the three main steps of the strategy:

First step: to establish a transcontinental transportation corridor with rapid, convenient, and reliable conveyance of freight between East Asia and Europe; Second step: to modernize existing enterprises and construct new enterprises in the south-eastern areas for the processing of Siberian natural resources on the basis of European investment and with a view to sale on Asian markets; Third step: in alliance with universities in Western Europe to fight for Asian markets with their growing demand for education, science, and new technologies.

The Siberian cold and Siberian distances are not a curse but a challenge.

Siberians have always been able to respond to the sternest challenges. But in the current era of globalization both the stakes and the opportunities are greater than ever.

Hence, too, a simple moral-not to rail against our accursed fate and the cold, not to flee in deference to the know-it-alls across the ocean, but to look around us, think, decide, find allies, and act. How else will you survive in Siberia?