THE MEANING OF HISTORY AS A TRIAL
FOR HUMANITY:
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR
GLOBAL MULTILEVEL LEGAL AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Published:
Problems of Contemporary World Futurology. Cambridge Scholars Publishing,
2011, pp.50-75.
But it
seems not to have concerned Nature that man should live well, but only that he
should work himself upward so as to make himself, through his own actions,
worthy of life and of well-being. [...] The greatest problem for the
human race, to the solution of which Nature drives man, is the achievement of a
universal civic society which administers law among men.
Immanuel Kant
Philosophical approach in
meditations about global future is adequate at least for three reasons. At
first, the philosophy has always been and will likely remain an excellent
critical weapon, a means for overcoming outdated, impeding development
ideologies (although new ideologies are usually made up from old philosophical
ideas that have become thought cliché). Secondly, the philosophy
surpasses all other approaches in the breadth of vision, and namely the breadth
is significant in today's conflictual world. Thirdly, as it will be shown
later, the future does not exist, no positive science of anything non-existent
is possible, all prognostic approaches have well known limitations, not to
mention the fact that neither science nor prognostics are capable in general to
provide own value and normative judgments. At the same time philosophy, which
obtains a wide range of well elaborated, non-trivial ways of abstract
reasoning, can and should advance significantly our thinking about global and
national future.
Nonclassical Ontology of Time:
Future as ‘a Garden of Emerging Paths’
The physical picture of
the world, especially, the idea of four dimensions, i.e. three-dimensional
space and the fourth axis of time, played with us all a cruel joke. Spatial
imagery is extremely powerful and suggestive. We envision a time axis stretching to the past
(which is calculated in years and centuries) and to the future (again, calendars
and annual marks in our plans reinforce this image). The real massive inertia of
the entire human civilization and nature on the Earth, and of outer space convinces
us further in pre-existence of the total temporal forward-looking vector which seems
to be completely symmetric to the vector of the past. If we leave out the
apocalyptic scenarios of nuclear war, a collision of the planet with a huge
asteroid and universal destruction, etc., it is safe to predict that in 10, 50
and 100 years not only mountains, seas and deserts will continue to exist, but
also cities, universities, research centers, churches, businesses and financial
institutions, railways, communications, air and sea transport. If they all will
be there in one form or another, it is quite possible to imagine (and we do
imagine this!) that they already are there at the correspondent points in
the forward-looking time axis.
Now consider an entirely
different ontology of time. There is no axis going to the future (besides
calendars, plans and projections that are made by people and exist in the
present). Every moment of the present creates ranges of possibilities for all things, phenomena, and
processes in the whole Universe. Much remains unchanged, but some
possibilities connect with other ones, in the next time moment the
configuration of things and events changes that immediately becomes covered
with new possibilities, including those that could not previously appear (!) So,
every moment of time is something like a garden of forking paths in Borges’s
story, but the difference is that besides the next moment there is not yet any
garden with paths. The paths themselves
and their furkations are created by movement
along them.
Accordingly to
historical rhythms of stability and instability some opportunities of social
world expand and other opportunities are narrowed down to extinction. In all these
processes people are involved, from individuals to nations and state coalitions,
but people rarely think about the invisible spectrum of possibilities, which
are narrowed or expanded as unintended consequences of their actions and
activities.
Not fixed but emerging future
gives the meaning of a trial to our lives and to our history. Why does
the meaning of history is a trial? For philosophical justification of this
thesis we turn now to a thought experiment concerning the extreme limit of
human existence, i.e. the end of history.
The
Philosophy of Human Existence:
From the End of History to the Idea of Trial
Usually the meaning of history is treated by analogy with a meaning of some individual
event which has a beginning and
an end, while namely the end and results of this process form the picture. That is why the end of history is arbitrarily associated
by religions and philosophies with values, metaphysical, theological, mystical
or other characteristics that define in turn the desirable meaning of history.
Even avoiding such kinds of attribution we should agree that the nature of the
end of history (when and no matter how it will occur) largely determines its
meaning.
Is it possible at all to make judgements about
the real end of history (i.e. the complete disappearance of people) with any
degree of credibility? This can be done, but
only in two cases.
First, in absence of of extraterrestrial human
colonies capable to exist fully autonomously, some natural processes can be detected
(probably associated with evolution of the Sun, or internal physical dynamics
in the structure of the Earth, or a trajectory of any celestial bodies, or
cosmic radiation, etc.) that lead to occurrence of conditions excluding the very
possibility of human existence on the Earth. All such opportunities fall under
the category of the natural end of
history.
Secondly, the onset of such conditions can be
predicted if the processes leading to them are caused by some actions of people
themselves (e.g., ‘nuclear winter’ after a series of nuclear strikes, or
destruction of the atmosphere protective properties because of massive
industrial emissions). Thus, there is talking about an artificial, or
man-made, end of history[1].
Let us see what can be said about the meaning
of human history in the first case[2].
Imagine, there are no people, all human civilization is destroyed. It is
possible to reconstruct apriori that one or another of the three main possibilities
has been occurred before this global collapse:
1) a global catastrophe overtook the planet of a
sudden for people;
2) people
knew for some
time of impending catastrophe, they started to do something to save humanity
but it was too late;
3) it was known long before of impending
catastrophe, people managed to create everything they could invent for
salvation, but to no avail.
Extreme points (1 and 3) are pure forms, they refer
primarily to the lack of intellectual (cognitive and creative) abilities of
people: in the first case people failed to foresee the catastrophe, in the
third case they could not devise a reliable way for salvation. The point (2) is
a mixed form: people failed to anticipate the catastrophe in advance; they could
not invent in a short time an achievable way of salvation; they could not provide
enough material and organizational capacity in order to have time to avoid full
extermination.
Now consider the case of a man-made catastrophe. The most prominent are “the
nuclear winter’ which is unavoidable after a sufficiently long series of
powerful nuclear strikes, and the destruction of the protective properties of
the atmosphere because of industrial emissions. Such events occur when people
are not able to foresee the disastrous consequences of their actions, or they are
not able to stop these actions, knowing these consequences. Besides the same
cognitive abilities of foresight, here there is a question of abilities to
negotiate, to convince, to come to mutually acceptable agreements for avoiding
disaster, and for establishing effective control over the implementation of the
reached agreements. Along with the importance of diplomatic skills (in the
broadest sense), moral components, organizational and coercive powers of
control, an intellectual creativity also plays a key role here, because it lets
invent a version of agreements which allow parties to refrain from dangerous
actions and which are acceptable from the standpoint of their interests.
Let us note the similarities of all the
options considered. Everywhere in the foreground are the intellectual
(cognitive and creative) people's abilities for long-term prognosis and
diagnosis of various hazards to the human condition, for invention of ways and
means of salvation. Under the terms of the task (the real end of history)
these abilities were inadequate in each case. What are the hidden
premises of this simple judgment?
Human abilities proved to be insufficient in
this case, since if they would have been sufficient then humanity managed to
survive (even if not all of humanity, but part of it able to reproduce, and
then the end of history would not come). There is nothing artificial in
assigning an attribute of failure to a
version of global human extermination and in assigning success to salvation and recovery. Thus, we obtain the following
conceptual construction: if due to the accumulated abilities something is
managed to be done it leads to a successful result, if not, the failure occurs.
Now it becomes obvious that this design is
fully consistent with the notion of a trial. Note that we have not
assigned the concept of trial to the end of history apriori and voluntarily. We
have accomplished the thought experiment, scrutinized main possible variants, revealed
general features and hidden premises and we have come to the following
conclusion: the real end of history (the cessation of existence of all
humanity) in any case can come as a result
of human failure in some cricual trial[3].
The thought experiment highlights significance of
protection of basic conditions for human existence; the correspondent responsibility
always takes place implicitly and becomes explicit when real dangers are seen.
If the trial is so important in imaginable extreme situation why not to think
that other various trials also take palce in our life both implicitly and
explicitly?
What is it possible to say about the role of
trials in social and historical reality? The
ontology of time built above helps us to answer such questions.
Fundamental Social Processes:
Construction, Taking Shape
(Emerging), and Trial
The present makes its
way into future ‘emptiness’ forming in every moment a new range of
possibilities, moving forward and transforming into a new present only through
implementation of some possibilities and ignoring (and sometimes eliminating)
other ones.
People have long been rather
skillful in operating these possibilities in artificial construction processes
when all tools and resources are visible and fully controlled. In order to transform
a draft of a house into a real one, in order to build a real railway drawn on
the map across the mountains and rivers, in order to give flesh to compicate
designs of ocean liner or spaceship, etc. builders consistently perform
well-known series of actions, in each phase creating precisely those possibilities
realization of which promotes the construction along the planned track.
In societies, especially
in international relations the “natural” processes of emerging (taking shape,
turning out, forming, developing) dominate. Here there is no centralized
effective control over production and realization of possibilities. Large and
small groups with various resources control only rather narrow sectors of possibilities,
usually competing and conflicting with each other that results in ‘natural’ processes
of forming, or taking shape. All histories are written quite rightly in the
paradigm of emerging and forming. We try to predict, to forecast those events
that we cannot design and build, i.e. results of emerging.
If construction is ‘artificial’
and emerging is “natural”, then the processes of trial are hybrid. A trial is on
the one hand an attempt to succeed, to achieve a goal, to implement the
conceived idea or a project. On the other hand, in contrast to construction, those
who pass a trial have not complete control over basic resources and conditions.
Circumstances will take shape this or that way. Therefore, the trial can lead
to success, to some middle result or to failure.
Usually we talk only
about institutionalized trials, or tests, in very narrow ranges: in sport, in new
technology, in education. But we can open eyes to a much wider applicability of
this category.
Each time when a man and
a woman decide to get married, they try somehow to design and construct their
relations, their living togeather and new family in order to achieve welfare
and happiness. Alas, not all couples pass this test successfully as evidenced
by a lot of divorces and unhappy families.
Each city is to some
extent planned. However, some cities are becoming very attractive, beautiful,
clean, safe and comfortable, people want to settle down here, and tourists from
all over the world come. At the same time, other
cities suffer from smog, dust, traffic congestion, poverty and crime. Is it not
possible to say that some urban planners, city officials, ‘city fathers’ have
stood the test with flying colors, while others failed it miserably?
On one hand, each
society mainly emerges and takes shape for many decades and even centuries. On
the other hand, history of major political leaders, constitutions, legal codes,
reform projects, etc. consistently shows attempts to construct something.
Therefore, qualities of a given society are always a result of permanent
trials. It is both possible to succeed or not to succeed in social construction
attempts within forming circumstances[4].
How do we all live on the planet Earth? How
will live here our children and grandchildren? There are no fundamental
obstacles (other than long-standing habits of thought), to extend the category
of trial for the global international community. Will the human race manage to
arrange life on the planet in a decent and not shameful way? Moreover, what
exactly is the trial for humanity, apart from the evident task of self-protection
and prevailing dangers? How to get an idea for this additional content of a
global historical trial, i.e. the real meaning of history?
Along with the challenge to save the human race
from natural or artificial extermination there has to be some kind of global
trial for a positive achievement. Here we come to the fundamental problems
of classical ethics. Is there some general moral meaning of human history? What
does deserve to strive in a global scale, not for a separate individual or a group,
but for all nations and mankind as a whole? What is Good?
Difficulties of Common Moral
Judgments
Ethical systems claiming
to universality are numerous, but none of them has found universal acceptance.
Perhaps the closest to this goal is the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Its
norms are far from ubiquitous obeyance, but almost nobody openly criticizes
them. The reasons for this success are not accidental. The main difficulty
resides in the inevitability of cultural diversity and variety of correspondent
systems of sacred symbols, values, ideals, principles, and so on. Namely the
protection of this diversity (‘Everyone has the right ...’) gave to the
Declaration of Human Rights an actual well-deserved status of championship in
terms of recognition breadth among all other moral and legal doctrines.
This diversity is not so
much a mosaic but includes two large poles of attraction, which can be called cultures
of freedom and cultures of order.
Cultures of freedom,
which are usually, though not entirely correctly, called Western and ‘modern’, include
the ideas and practices of liberalism, political and civil rights, hedonism
(pursuit of pleasure), and eudemonism (pursuit of happiness); usually they have
a progressist orientation. Here governs
the principle ‘what I want’ (personal freedom, independence from everyone).
Such cultures are comfortable and attractive, they are associated with rather
high life quality for wide layers of population (the main stream of
international migration is directed to Western countries where cultures of
freedom predominate). At the same time such cultures are fraught with
consumerism, decay of moral fortitude, anomia (loss of meaning of life), correspondent
escapes to alcoholism, drug abuse, and antisocial behavior.
Cultures of order,
which are not quite correctly associated with the East, usually are centered
around some strict religion or ideology; they are rigouristic, based on spiritual,
social and physical coercion; they include ideas and practices of moral duties,
obligations, sacrifice and salvation, usually they have a traditionalist (including
fundamentalist) orientation. Here governs the principle ‘To what should I obey’
(general order which is obligatory for everyone). Moral fortitude and ability
to endure hardship are cultivated. At the same time, such cultures are often
accompanied by extreme intolerance toward anything alien and new. Here one can
meet rigid morals, even cruelty, fanaticism and a penchant for extreme forms of
aggression (terrorism, ethnic cleansing, revolutionary violence, ‘holy wars’,
including, by the way , wars for “export of democracy and freedom’).
The majority of both Western and Eastern cultures are located between
these poles and combine elements of freedom and elements of order in various
proportions. Any general ethical idea will be attacked from all sides: either
as an undue imposition of norms and goals, as impermissible restriction of
freedom, or as different from rules and norms of some culture of order.
As we can see, the difficulties are quite significant, and it is quite
intriguing if and how it is possible to overcome them by means of philosophical
reasoning. We should address now to philosophical theory of
values, i.e. axiology.
Constructive axiology:
Diversity of Ethos Values and Necessity for
Values of General Significance
Values
are conceptually rationalized normative foundations of consciousness and
behavior acts of intelligent beings (humans).
The main bulk of human values are ethos
values, they belong to a concrete ethos,
i.e. to a community which reproduces itself in generations and obtains
particular religion, culture, beliefs and so on. Ethnoses, nations, castes,
faith-based, professional and other communities with high levels of
self-consciousness, all sorts of stable groups with their subcultures are covered
here by the generic concept of ethos.
Recognition of equality among all varieties of ethos value systems is
the basis of the value relativism (quiete close to multiculturalism), which is
characteristic for the cultures of freedom. There are well-known dangers of this
doctrine: lack of moral grounds to oppose such activities as genocide,
terrorism, torture, extrajudicial killings, rape, abuse of minors, cannibalism
and so on. Some ethos groups can declare such acts as relevant to their value
system and so reject any bans as not absolute, but based only on some other equal value systems. The classic response to the value relativism always
slipped to claiming this or that value system as supreme, absolute and
universally normative (mandatory for all), i.e. adoption of one or
another version of the value dogmatism
which is characteristic for the cultures of order.
The
ethical concept of constructive axiology
is an attempt to sugges the via media: defend of the regulatory universality
(the interactive priority) for a definite range of values combined with
rejection of claims to their highest absolute status [Rozov 1990; Rozov 1998,
section 2.1).
Values of general
significance (minimal universal norms, thin moral code) are conceptual
expression of the main conditions that must be fulfilled to preserve the
ability of all people (individuals, groups, communities) to implement their
ethos values (culturally specific, thick moral codes) [5].
Axiological analysis allows to identify two classes of values of general significance (VGS): cardinal values that mean primary
conditions realization of any values (thus, human life, health, dignity,
fundamental rights and individual freedoms belong to cardinal values) and subcardinal values that refer to
conditions necessary for implementation of these primary conditions (forms
of social protection, political legal norms to protect the individual and basic
civil rights, normal environmental habitat needed to maintain health,
international standards for peace and security, etc.).
There is an important and subtle point: one should not confuse interactive priority (minimal
universality, general significance) of values in the thin code and supremacy of highest values in various
thick codes. No self-respecting culture, religion or national ideology will recognize
any value higher than its own sacred symbols. Debates of this kind will never
lead to agreement, in contrast they are fraught with alienation, violence up to the
massive bloodshed and wars.
At the same time, adherents of different ethos value systems (thick
codes) must interact, negotiate about rules of exchange, communication,
cooperation, dispute resolution, including such sharp issues as territorial
conflicts. To do this, some kind of common platform is
always need. Adoption of any local, specific
value system (f.e. liberal Western values which belong to cultures of freedom) as
such platform will certainly undermine beliefs
and insult followers of other systems (especially which belong to cultures of
order). In this regard, values of general significance (the thin code) are
essential, because they are formulated as the necessary conditions for
implementation by various communities
their various systems of values and
interests (their thick codes).
From Universal Human Needs
to the Idea of Global Trial
The naïve and hopeless approach in thinking about real
historical dynamics and direction of social evolution is a humanitarian starry-eyed
idealism, i.e. the idea that history is driven by some ideal values. Alas, the real history
is mostly determined by conflict and dominance while the major factor of
dominance within a society and between societies is efficiency of social
structures and regimes[6].
Is there in
such a gloomy, almost Machiavellian, vision of history some place for values,
especially for values of general significance (the thin code)? Let us take a
roundabout approach to values through those human needs that underly
the ongoing growth of regimes’ efficiency in history.
Let
us consider the following questions: Are there and what are universal needs
characteristic for human nature? How do they relate with processes of emerging
(taking shape), constructing and trial? And how can it help us to make more
clear the problem of the global trial?
The
answer to the first question seems to be very complicate because of tremendous
variety of human goals and (ethos) values. Nevertheless we can abstract from intermediary
means and focus our attention on final features of situations in which people feel
themselves satisfied and happy; namely these features make people ready to
struggle for protection such situations and such way of life. In this aspect the most universal
aspirations of people throughout history in all societies and civilizations are
security and three types of comfort:
dignity (honour, status, prestige, self-respect, i.e. social comfort), well-being (level and quality of life, i.e. material comfort), and meaningfullness
of life (feelings of moral, religious, political justification of own life,
i.e. spiritual, inner comfort).
If we
examine accurately final objectives of any human purposeful activity (processes
of constructing), we always can reveal some combination of security and these
three types of comfort as the common denominator. Actually, domination, power,
and wealth give social and material comfort, sense of security. Freedom,
support, solidarity, and rights provide social comfort and security. Satisfaction
of religious and aesthetic needs provide spiritual and social comfort, moreover
religions of salvation give feelings of security.
Further,
it appears that efficient technologies, social forms and cultural patterns are
almost never effective for everybody. On the contrary, growth of security for
one group frequently leads to infringement of safety for neighbouring groups. Effects
of this kind are manifested most acutely in situations of scarce resources, that
give rise to conflicts, often burdened with violence: riots or wars which
immediately bring down the level of basic human needs of large masses of
people. Constructing (including
conflictual) activities of various
groups clash with each other that leads to historical and evolutionary processes of taking shape.
What is
it possible to say in this context about trial
processes not for a concrete group in a concrete period but in global
social and temporal scale? The answer suggests itself: this global trial is
protection of possibilities of people to satisfy their universal needs, at
least in those limits that do not violate others possibilities. Thus, we come
again to the normative requirement of concern for conditions that allow people
accomplish their own (ethos) goals and values. Conceptual explication of these
conditions are values of general
significance (the thin code).
Note that
these values are very close to basic human needs outlined above. Cardinal values of life and health directly
correspond to the need for security. Dignity
is at the same time a universal social need and a value of general significance
becaues permanent humiliation (violation of human dignity) impedes
accomplishement of any other values. Such subcardinal values as civil rights and freedoms are general terms
for social comfort. Environmental values (purity of
atmosphere, water, forest health, nutrition quality, etc.) also express the
conditions for health and well-being (material,
physical comfort).
Thus, the
purpose of the values of general significance (the thin code) is to protect possibilities
of people to reach basic human needs. The correspondent value meaning of
history is revealed as a trial for
mankind's ability to protect values of general significance and basic human
needs in emerging conditions. The latter are often characterized by lack of
resources, conflicts between different groups and nations, competition, aggression,
and violence. That is why we should now leave the celestial realm of abstract
values and turn to earthly realities of social world, i.e. to analysis of
social groups (in wide sense) and their interaction.
From Values to Social Groups:
New
Among all
variety of types of social groups (from married couples to societies and
civilizations) let us consider two extreme types that are most relevant to the
themes under discussion.
First,
there are groups in which basic universal needs (security and three types of
comfort) are filled best of all in absence of outer conflicts and competition.
These goups are fundamental social conditions that should be protected.
Second,
there are groups that can be constructed, at least partly. One can expect that
namely groups of this type developed in processes of constructing and taking
shape in social-evolutionary progress to more effective regimes, social forms
and cultural patterns.
Strange
as it may seem, the two types defined by
this way almost fully correspond with the classical opposition by Ferdinand Tönnies: Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft [Tönnies 1957].
Tönnies
was both a forerunner and antagonist of modernization theorists. He believed
that Gemeinschaft as a traditional,
organic, full of intimacy community has been steadily replaced by Gesellschaft as a modern, mechanistic,
based on bargaining and contract society which he clearly associated with
Marx's capitalist society (the very term ‘capitalism’ was invented by Georg
Zimmel).
It should
be noted that Gemeinschafts did not disappear over the past 130 years. Kinship,
friendship, neighborship and other types of communities with srong mutual
support and emotional solidarity still exist. Perhaps now there are fewer large
traditional clans. Old patrimonial Gemeinschaft are close to disappearance in
modern societies, but multiple professional associations, various circles and clubs
emerge and spread not only within one nation, but also at international level.
Happiness
can be defined as experience of maximal and reliable social and spiritual
comfort (see above) and it is possible to argue that people become happy receiving
recognition, support and meaningfullness of life in their Gemeinschafts. Accorfing to the Durkheimian sociological tradition
[Warner 1959; Goffman 1967; Scheff 1990; Collins 2004] people gain sustained peace
of mind and fullness of life meaning
namely in regular direct emotional encounters (interaction rituals) with loved ones, family, peers, i.e. in their Gemeinschafts.
At the
same time groups, that can be partly construed and visibly develop in history,
belong to the type of Gesellschaft: kingdoms, empires, cities-states (polices),
nation-states, international alliances and organizations.
Instead of Tönnies’s formule (replacement of Gemeinschaft by Gesellschaft) I suggest more flexible and
potentially more rich principle: Gemeinschafts
and Gesellschafts
coexist and change throughout all human history, while a (usually larger) Gesellschaft
forms social environment for many (usually
smaller) Gemeinschafts.
Both
types of groups correspond with ethos values and values of general significance.
Variety of ethos values systems (thick codes) corresponds to a larger variety
of Gemeinschafts where these values born and live.
Values of
general significance (the thin code) are, in essence, products of negotiation
and conflict resolution, and belong to a formal Gesellschaft. When different
Gemeinschafts, especially with different ethos values and competing interests,
collide, their needs for security and resources demand some formal treaties and
general impersonal rules. Normative and conceptual foundations of these
regulatives are minimal values, i.e. VGS, the thin code. After the middle of 20-th
century utopian aspirations to transform the entire society, nation-state or
the whole world into a single Gemeinschaft were discredited as useless (and even
dangerous) whether the basis is a common faith, a common ideology, common
principles of social order, etc. Public order and the normal functioning within
majority of modern countries are supported primarily through impersonal legal
norms and institutions, i.e. by means of Gesellschaft.
Distinction
between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft is inextricably linked with the divergence
between cultures of freedom and cultures of order.
Cultures of
freedom (‘Western’ or ‘modern’ ones) have well-developed Gesellschaft-like formal
legal systems and give tremendous opportunities to build new Gemeinschaft communities,
but these cultures often undermine old, traditional Gemeinschafts based on
kinship and religion. The scourge of societies with cultures of freedom is
anomie which is a consequence of individualism according to Durkheim, that is
falling out of warm, sincere, giving meaning to life traditional Gemeinschafts.
Cultures
of order (‘Eastern’, ‘traditional’ ones) from the outside can seem as only rigid,
mechanistic and coercive Gesellschafts, but this impression is deceptive. Here,
family relationships, including emotional ties among brothers and sisters,
uncles, aunts and their nephews, between cousins and cousins, even between
distant relatives are usually full of warmth, affection, mutual debt especially
in comparison with cultures of freedom. In other words, in cultures of order people
as elsewhere gain meanings of life, moral dignity and happiness in their
Gemeinschafts, albeit more traditional, more related to kinship and proximity
than to individual preferences for leisure (hobbies).
Thus in
spite of seemingly incompatible differences we can identify certain universal
features of cultures of freedom and cultures of order. Moreover, the most acute
forms of aggression (terrorism, war-making) are connected usually with a
response to threats (real or imaginary) to the ‘way of life’ and ‘fundamental
values’ of people. Actually it means protection of life of (gaining more space
for) Gemeinschafts enveloped by this or that conflicting Gesellschaft.
Now the
social meaning of history becomes more clear as the following trial: if the mankind in permanent conditions of
conflict can come to secure preservation, peaceful coexistence and free
development of varieties of Gemeinschafts (in which people acquire moral
dignity, meaningfullness life and happiness) through rational construction of
Gesellschafts in negotiations and compromises.
The Cardinal Reframing:
in Order to Protect
Own Gemeinschaft
to Develop Covering Gesellschaft
Nobody
should be persuaded to care about his or her Gemeinschaft. The
very prestige of of these communities’ members is largely determined by their
contribution into maintaining, success and expanding of their Gemeinschaft, and
prestige is always a powerful motivating force.
Much more
complicated is the case with formal Gesellschafts, especially the newly
established and the remote ones. Here the hardest are effects of ‘free rider’(well
known in institutionalism): it is a good idea to use for free public goods
(such as security guarantees) provided by a distant formal structure, but that
does not mean willingness to spend forces, time and resources (which are always
deficient) for its establishment and support.
In this case,
any attempts to persuade are of little use. People can experience the needed mental
shift only in a situation of challenge, i.e. growth of personal and group
discomfort, increasing threats to familiar way of life and to the very
existence of their Gemeinschafts. The main and almost universal behavior
pattern in this situation is so called group egoism: people do everything to
restore favorable conditions for themeselves and their Gemeinschafts (sometimes
to an alliance of such communities), albeit at the expense of the social
environment. Just in this point a fundamental shift of mental attitudes is required,
which I suggest to name the cardinal reframing: in terms of sustainability and friendliness of the future social
environment, the optimal response to a challenge (some threat to or a breach of
usual way of life and correspondent Gemeinschafts) is not trying to seize somebody
elses' resources but to establish and promote such a covering formal Gesellschaft
which will ensure the safety and comfort living conditions for own and others’ Gemeinschafts
(neighbouring and remote, competing and even hostile ones).
Actually,
the cardinal reframing is not a new idea. It is based on the same value (‘the thin
code’) principle: to take care of conditions for accomplishing
ethos values not only for own communitybut also for other ones (see above).
Cardinal reframing is always a transition from ‘a zero-sum game’ to ‘a nonzero-sum game’, it is a
principle of not ‘dividing a pie’ but rather a principle of joint efforts to
increase it. Every time when representatives of different communities negotiate
and agree about common rules for a peaceful and amicable cooperation instead of
trying to capture resources from each other, they act in accordance with the
cardinal reframing. In other words, it is already there in culture and
traditions of all societies, and the question is how and in what directions its
scope can be globally expanded.
What
covering formal structures should there be?
The Optimal Form of Gesellschafts for the Global Future:
International Law and Courts
If we
talk only about major standard forms of Gesellschafts, there just a few types: a bureaucratic hierarchy with an undivided
authority or a collegiate body at its top, a
representative assembly (parliament) and resolving issues by voting, bargaining and deals, law (a system of legal norms, usually elaborated
by a representative assembly) and courts
ensuring the law. In modern international relations all
these forms are present: there is a bureaucratic apparatus with an elected Chairman
of the UN and the collegial Security Council, the UN Assembly with the order of
universal and equal voting; there are also regular or occasional meetings of ‘G7’,
‘G8’, ‘20’ and so on. There is a system of international law and the
International Court of Justice in
I hardly
need to argue that the most ‘weight’, i.e. real significance for subsequent
political, security and economic actions belongs to decisions of the
international ‘closed clubs’ - most of all, the ‘G7’, the real leadership of
NATO, and the UN Security Council (up to the end of 20-th century). Namely the
closure of these ‘clubs’ permanently casts doubt on legitimacy and validity of
their decisions.
Bilateral
(or multilateral) agreements are also essential but they are certainly not
legitimate for all other countries that do not participate in these treaties.
The system of voting in the UN is very cumbersome and is questionable in its
essence (one country/one vote, regardless of its size and international
reputation), that is why no important decisions are accepted in this way.
The International
Court of Justice in
In spite
of all this, it is the international law with international multi-tiered
judicial system that has the greatest potential to resolve conflicts and
tensions beyond national jurisdiction. Such law can be established and updated
through the system of international representation, which provides not only
general acceptability of its norms but also its high legitimacy. Courts may
have regional jurisdiction and be linked together in an ordered hierarchy.
Courts can be specialized and recruited of high-class professionals from
different countries on the basis of elections within an international judicial
community, with principles of mandatory rotation and broad representation.
International courts can have essential powers for maintaining their decisions
through financial leverage, when all governments of states-founders are making
large deposits (eg, in proportion to their GDPs) and should pay considerable fines
for insubordination to internationsl judicial decisions.
Finally,
there is an abstract, but significant political and philosophical argument. Of
course, the universal formal law, common to all countries and nations (or
regional law, that is obligatory to countries founding a regional court) is the
essence of the principle of ‘mechanical’ and ‘alienated’ Gesellschaft. Most
likely, it will be based on ‘minimal’ values of general significance (the thin
code): protecting life, health, rights and freedoms of individuals and
communities, especially those enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights with further additions and refinements. At the same time, international
law, in drafting and approval of which will be involved representatives of
different cultures, including opposite to each other, thereby will provide
opportunities for protection and development of variety of Gemeinschafts,
respectively, of diverse systems of ethos values (thick codes) that give
meaning to life and the moral dignity to members of these communities. This factor
attaches to the international legal and judicial system high civilizational
status of response to a challenge, i.e. an effort to pass the global trial, the
value and social content of which was explicated above.
What Does the Multilevelness of the Legal
and Judicial System Mean?
Currently,
almost everywhere, national legislations are elaborated and national judicial
systems operate. In federal states, there is also jurisdiction of individual
states and territories. Local governments, local and scattered ethnic groups,
individuals, usually completely subordinate to national law and do not even
have a destination for their appeals because at the level of world regions
there are no international courts (except Europe with the Strasbourg Court).
Problems and weaknesses of the only international court at the global level (the
Hague Court of Justice) have already been noted above.
The multilevelness
of international legal system means, first of all, filling the main ‘void’: the
establishment of new specialized courts at the global and regional levels, as
well as building them into regular relationships among themselves and with
lower levels: national and provincial legal/judicial systems.
It is
possible to make a sketch of such multilevel system for the five most important
areas of international conflicts and cooperation: geopolitics, geo-economics,
geoculture, environment and domestic policy. For brevity, we consider in each
area only the most obvious and typical conflicts that urgently need invention
of reasonable, compromise and effective rules of international law and
effective resolution at the regional and global levels.
The Multi-level
Legal Alternative
IN GEOPOLITICS
The
enwided understanding of geopolitics involves not only issues of military and
political power in the territories, respectively, of war and peace, collapse
and consolidation of states, but also such topics as (non)proliferation of mass
destruction weapons and international arms trade.
The most
common forms of conflicts are associated with a well-known contradiction
between the principle of peoples’ right of self-determination and the principle
of state integrity, also between the right of sovereign states to develop their
military power and limitations made by international organizations and world hegemonies.
Unfortunately,
there is no not only practice but even ideas of judicial resolution of most
acute international conflicts which are prone to military activities and mass
violence. The situation will changed radically only after appearance of specialized
courts in each major world region on security issues, border demarcation, separatism
(self-determination of nations), the location of military bases and major
military operations, especially outside own borders, conflicts of arms and drug
trafficking, etc.
On
one hand, such regional courts can be effective only if they are organized and
supported by leading countries of a world region. On the other hand, these
courts should not be transformed into tools of regional unfair hegemony and expansion.
That is why they must be built in a united global judicial system headed by a
correspondent specialized international court under UN auspices (probably,
reformed and strenghthed Internation Court of Justice in the Haague). Such
system will be more sencitive to regional specifics, international legal and
judicial system will not be perceived in the world as an instrument of Western
powers for revenge ‘delinquent’ countries and national leaders.
The main obstacle on this way
should be noted: it is extremely difficult for ruling national elites to
deliever their sovereign powers, especially in military and
geopolitical areas, to any outer organizations, even to regional courts that
these national elites themselves had created. Actually, the most institutionalized
and traditionally sacred form of group egoism is presented by so called
‘national interests’ (usually reduced to interests of national ruling elites).
A difficult task restrict this egoism in favour of new regional and global
judicial system as a covering formal organization (Gesellschaft) is the same cardinal reframing necessity of which
was stated above.
The
general principle of law in this area is to deliever security guarantees and
fair consideration of demands to each country and side in a conflict in
exchange of restrictions recognition and subordination to judicial decisions.
It is a multilateral legal coherence of such restrictions at the regional and
global levels that provides reliable security and opens the way for step by
step peaceful resolution of the most acute conflicts including territorial and
ethnic ones.
IN GEO-ECONOMICS
Geo-economics
includes all processes of production, exchange and distribution that cross
political boundaries[7]. The main problems
in this area are periodical crises, as well as a dangerously
growing gap in economic development and welfare between various countries and various
world regions. Conflicts are generated by opposing geo-economic interests of
sovereign states, of international organizations (such as the WTO and the
development banks) and of multinational companies.
The main megatrend
which generates economic crises can be designated as a permanent backlog of
development of institutions and practices ensuring economic responsibility from
the growth of speed, density and extent of economic interactions. It is an
obvious need to establish systems of rules at every level (global, regional,
national and local), which would ‘have enough time’ to maintain economic
responsibility in terms of this growth, also to provide control over compliance
of these rules in accordance with international agreements, to organize necessary
institutions: legislature and courts.
The best principle
in this area is the contract law. Delayed negative consequences of economic actions
will receive authorship (which is now missing), if these actions will be
performed on the basis of contracts. Each potentially dangerous economic action
(giving loans, issuance of shares, securities, derivatives, etc.) must include correspondent
commitment inscribed in these contracts. It is through these commitments the possible
victims of economic damage can go to court with lawsuits.
Again,
the main legal principle in this area is a multilateral legal coherence of
economic actors through taking contractual obligations that means definite
restriction of freedom of economic actions fraught with injury to other parties.
IN
GEOCULTURE
Geoculture
includes the processes of production, exchange, distribution and consumption of
cultural patterns (in literature, art, philosophy, science, religion, ideology,
social media, etc.) that cross political boundaries. Namely in this area,
conflicts between cultures of freedom and cultures of the order reach extreme
degrees. Obvious examples are scandals around the novels of Salman Rushdie,
cartoons in the Danish magazine. In both cases the Western principle of freedom
of speech and deep offend of Muslims by unflattering images of the Prophet
Mohammad entered to clinch[8].
Despite
the ‘sexual revolution’ the struggle is simmering and probably will never stop
about the demonstration of eroticism in the media and advertising, about
prostitution, about penetration of homosexuality in army and education, etc.
In all
these areas of legal principles should always be mutually acceptable and,
therefore, should form a compromise that requires concessions and
self-restraint from all parties of such conflicts. Defenders of free speech and
creative self-expression will likely have to agree to a limited, marked by
warnings order for distribution of conflictual products (just as ‘adult
magazines’ are usually sold). Defenders of strict moral and religious rules
have to contend with such enclave existence of disturbing phenomena and
practices. Inevitable conflicts at the borders generated by ideals of freedom
and ideals moral order (as well as ambition and intransigence) on both sides must
be resolved just in the courts.
IN ECOLOGY
At the
international level main ecological conflicts occur between contaminants and
pollutants (especially when one country occupies an area upstream of a great
river, and another is located below). Also there are conflicts between
interests of local people and polluting multinational companies which often
bribe officials and reconcile a central government (which is usually located
remotely from this area) with their damaging activities.
Here
there is probably one of the biggest gaps between the high level of legal
protection of environment at the national level in developed countries (such as
Germany, France, UK, USA) and the extreme weakness of international
environmental law, not to mention weakness (absence) of effective international
environmental courts in most regions of the world.
Being
applied to domestically ecology, these questions are developed in detail on
theoretical, legal and economic levels. There are well-known requirements for
treatment facilities, permissible concentrations of harmful substances, simple
translation of the environmental damage scale to terms of fines, etc. There are
no difficult conceptual problems in extension of these norms from national to
international level. The problem is only in political will of national
govenments, especially of regional leaders, to establish such law and courts in
their areas.
IN DOMESTIC POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
From the
standpoint of values of general significance (see above), not whole internal
politics is purely an internal affair of a sovereign state.
Systematic
racial, religious discrimination, ethnic cleansing, tortures and inhumane
treatment of prisoners, non-legal repression against political opposition and media:
all of this is detrimental to basic human needs and rights, or creates a direct
threat to them, and therefore can not remain without attention from the
international community.
A well-known
problem is an extreme weakness of this community’s possibility to influence somehow
an offending state. This problem urgently requires a system of regional courts
and the global court at the UN (perhaps the Hague international court to be reformed)
which are specialized in protection of fundamental human rights.
Again,
the main difficulty is the lack of political will of national governements,
especially of regional leaders. Moreover, there is an opposition among supreme
authorities of these countries against the very idea of any restrictions from outside.
Do not think that this applies only to ‘rogue states’ like
How to
invent a sufficient motivation for supreme national authorities, how to make the
opportunity and the principle of international protection of fundamental human
rights generally valid, ho to make it a self-evident norm: this is a difficult
but worthy task for intellectuals, for national and international human rights
organizations[9].
How to Turn an Utopia into a
Global Implemented Project
Significance of Historical Dynamics Theories
It is
hardly to be hoped that the leaders of major countries suddenly will together build
a new international system of courts, moreover, restricting their own power. One
should count not on processes of construction but processes of emerging, taking
shape (see above).
How new
collegial institutions developed at regional and global levels? What are the
patterns of evolution of legal and judicial systems? What conditions led to the
flowering, decline or inhibition of these structures? All these questions belong
to historical macrosociology or
theoretical history [Mann 1987, 1983; Collins 1999; Rozov 1997; 2002; 2009].
Some of historical
patterns and principles are clear right now:
·
New collegial institution, especially a judicial
one, is viable only if it is supported by key interested centers of power;
·
Only a serious crisis would force ruling elites to
seek new answers;
·
Failure and discredit of former approaches opens
the way for new ones;
·
New international legal institutions will grow most
successfully only in world regions with already strong legal traditions and the
approximate parity of the founders (the undisputed leader in both criteria is
the European Union).
However, much
more questions remain unclear, that requires serious theoretical study,
respectively, some new large-scale research programs in the field of historical
macrosociology.
Instead of Conclusion:
the Trial for the Human Race Outlined by Immanuel Kant
Is to Be Passed Yet
Let us
return to Kant's thought as expressed in the epigraph to this paper: the main
challenge (test, trial) for the human race to be worthy for life and well-being
is to achieve universal legal civil society.
It is
known that the international projects of ‘the Holy Alliance’ and ‘the Concert
of Europe’ in the 19-th century, the League of Nations and the UN in the 20-th century
relied to a greater or lesser extent on the old ideas of perpetual peace by Abbe
de Saint-Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and in particular Immanuel Kant.
However, almost no one says that the global problem posed by Kant, is by no
means complete yet.
The
formula ‘to achieve universal legal civil society’ (‘die Erreichung einer allgemein das
Recht verwaltenden bürgerlichen Gesellschaft’) is rather close to the categorical
imperative as a key principle of Kant's ethics: to treat everyone not only as a
means but as a goal.
Thanks to
the institution of citizenship, each nation-state protects more or less its
citizens, and yet remains almost completely indifferent to non-citizens, to
strangers, and has no special moral and legal obligations to other states with
their citizens, especially to the weaker and somehow annoying countries. Kant's
appeal to create a union of states on a global scale through a series of
attempts (see above), finally, is embodied in United Nations, which protects sometimes
more, sometimes less effectively small and weak states from oppression and
aggression. However, the universal legal and civil principles, albeit
abstractly declared in the Declaration of Human Rights, still are not
institutionalized at the regional and global level, and virtually have no
effect beyond the developed legal societies.
The
multi-level legal and judicial system as a new stage of development of the
global Gesellschaft based on values of general significance should be just an embodiment
of this brave humanist idea by Immanuel Kant.
Perhaps
the ultimate trial for man and mankind is to understand what is it. On
understanding of it largely depends what will be the human Future.
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[1] All other judgments about the end of the history are
either anticipations of some new historical epoch, drawn with various ratios of
realism, esoteric or technical fantasy (an epoch of Superman by Nietzsche, Supermanhood
according to Vladimir Solovyov, civilization of Kibergs in science fiction,
etc..), or fully mystical views not correlated with any realistic perception of
history (Judgement in the Bible, "Omega Point" by Teyar de Chardin,
and analogues).
[2] It is clear that people can say nothing about this just because according
to fixed conditions of our task there will be no people at all on Earth or
beyond it. That is why our thinking about
"what can be said” refers to either representatives of extraterrestrial
intelligence (quite weird), or to an artificially constructed ideal position of
the external observer, similar to Kant's transcendental subject. We prefer the
second option, since this subject should obtain not only curiosity and
philosophical mood but also absolute cognitive abilities that help him to
reveal the causes of the global tragedy.
[3] Who sets trials to individuals, societies, and the whole humanity? Here
a religious person will think about
God. Immanuel Kant when meditating on such issues told about “the plan of
Nature” [Kant 1959]. A liberal or atheist can consider any decision about
trials to be the matter of exclusively personal freedom. If not to get stuck in
the differences between basic stereotypes of this kind (which are sacred for
each group and therefore incompatible) it is better to use a neutral vocabulary
of common problems and collective action, success and failure, constructing and
emerging, etc.
[4] The extent of society success can be measured by
various criteria, while the most clear and strong one is the direction of migration
flows: whether people flee from a given country or seek to visit it and live in
it.
[5] My
distinction between ethos values and values of general significance (VGS)
develops the long-standing coneption of minimum
universalism connected with such names as Hugo Grotius. In recent
decades John Rawls, Michael
Walzer, Mikael Baaz, Bhikhu Parekh et al. maintain the same basic idea but use various
terminologies [Rawls 1971; Walzer 1994; Baaz 2002]. Thus Walzer and Baaz make
distinction between thick (rich and
culturally specific) and thin
(minimal universal) moral codes. “The universal values constitute a kind
of “floor” — an irreducible minimum — which no chosen way of life can cross and
still claim to be good or even tolerated by others. When a society meets the
basic principles, it is (more or less) free to organise its own way of life,
just the way it considers being the best one” [Parekh 1999].
[6] This Kantian idea is strongly
supported by neoweberian historical macrosociology of last decades, see: [Skocpol
1979; Mann 1987, 1983; Goldstone 1991; Collins 1999; et al.].
[7] It means that geo-economics does not replace
geopolitics (as in [Luttwak 1990]) but always coexists with it.
[8] Sometimes, the Western culture of
freedom and Eastern culture of order are paradoxically reversed. For example, the
French law prohibiting wearing of veils in schools is, generally speaking, a repressive rule of compulsory order.
At the same time, Muslim women living in
[9] See also: [Menon 1992; Dunne and Wheeler 1999; Duner
2002; ].